Team Focus: How Did the USA Really do at the World Cup?

If the 2010 World Cup hinted at the potential for football in the United States, 2014 came close to realisation. Nearly 30,000 fans watched the USA’s last-16 clash with Belgium at Soldier Field, Chicago, with countless open-screenings also drawing supporters all over the country.

An estimated TV audience of 30 million watched the group draw against Portugal, with Jurgen Klinsmann’s side front-page news, while more US-based fans travelled to Brazil for the tournament than from any other country. The United States is no longer the footballing backwater it once was.

Those who still mock the American game do so in ignorance of the country’s consistent World Cup record, with the US qualifying for the last seven straight tournaments, making the last 16 four times over that stretch. But how well did the USA really do at this World Cup? Off the pitch, there is much for the American game to be positive about, but what about the actual performances Klinsmann’s side turned in?

Just like in any World Cup nation, the USA’s exit from the tournament at the hands of Belgium has been picked over and analysed to a forensic degree. Some believe they exceeded expectations, while others claim their elimination serves as some kind of indictment on the American game.

Klinsmann’s appointment was meant to herald a new era for the country’s national team. The USA were renowned as one of the hardest working teams in world football, but the German was named manager on the basis of his reputation as an exceptional technical coach.

He spoke about wanting to align the US with the rest of the world, calling up more and more, what you might call, ‘technical’ players. Klinsmann’s aim was to give his team more control in games against the elite sides they would face at the World Cup.

Yet the American side we watched in Brazil over the past three weeks conformed to the stereotype. They tried harder than anyone else - Michael Bradley ran further than any other player in the group stage - but did they really impose themselves in the way Klinsmann had envisaged?

The statistics suggest not. The USA had the seventh lowest average possession share of any team at the World Cup (43.2%) with Costa Rica the only side to make the last 16 with a lower average (41.9%).

America’s pass success rate makes for slightly better reading, completing 82.6% of their overall passes, but that only ranks them 14th of the 32 teams that took part in the tournament.

As an attacking unit, the USA also performed below par, averaging just 3.5 shots on target per game. Only two sides that made the last 16 - Costa Rica and Chile - could claim a lower tally. Their total shots on goal per game wasn’t much better, an average of 11 per match. But even more worrying for Klinsmann is the way his defence managed to mask its ineffectiveness with the heroics of goalkeeper Tim Howard and the stubbornness of centre-back Matt Besler.

The USA conceded more shots on their own goal than any other team at the World Cup (23.5 per game), with the second ranked team, Switzerland, over five shots per game behind the Americans (18.3 per game).

Averaging 21 tackles and 14.3 interceptions per game, the strain that was placed on the American defence over the course of the four games they played is clear. Had it not been for Howard - who made no less than 16 saves against Belgium, the most by any World Cup keeper since 1966 (via Opta) - things could have gotten very ugly.

So where were the positives for Klinsmann? Well, Jermaine Jones comes out of the tournament as something of vindication of the USA’s naturalisation programme since the last World Cup.

The Besiktas midfielder was often derided by US fans, deemed as unfit to tie the shoelaces of his partner Michael Bradley. Jones turned that narrative on its head in Brazil, netting a stunning strike against Portugal, as well as an assist. He averaged 2.8 shots per game, a credible tally from his position in the centre of midfield, while also making 1.5 tackles and 1.5 interceptions per game. He was the box-to-box force of nature that Klinsmann needed.

Meanwhile, Bradley endured a miserable campaign. The former Roma man averaged just 1 key pass per game, despite his team-high average of 63 passes per game. But on the most part, he struggled to grab a hold of any of the matches the USA played, in a way that’s difficult to illustrate with pure stats.

The deployment of Clint Dempsey up front, in light of Jozy Altidore’s injury in the opening game win over Ghana, could also go down as a highlight of the USA’s World Cup. The former Fulham and Spurs attacker was used in an unfamiliar lone forward role against Portugal, Germany and Belgium, and while he often lacked service, he made the most of what he was provided with. His average of 3 shots per game was a team high, also contributing 1.5 key passes per game, more than Bradley. And of course, Dempsey’s 2 goals went some way to carrying the USA out of the group.

Fabian Johnson also impressed down the right side of the US starting lineup, although his crossing average of 0.3 per game does a disservice to just how effective he was as an attacking outlet. His replacement in both games against Portugal and Belgium, DeAndre Yedlin, was actually more of a prolific crosser, making 2 against Portugal, perhaps by virtue of his natural right footedness.

Against Portugal, Graham Zusi also made 7 crosses from open play, demonstrating his capacity as a creative hub, but unfortunately for Klinsmann, the man regarded as one of the best in MLS lost his touch against Belgium, attempting 5, but completing 2.

Klinsmann was criticised before the World Cup for claiming his side couldn’t win the whole thing. Instead he insisted his aim was to get out of the so-called ‘Group of Death,’ which the US did. But did he fulfill the expectations of the American public? That might be a more poignant question.

How do you think USA performed at the World Cup? Let us know your thoughts in the comments below